

Dini Suryani

Master student at the College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University, Canberra. Researcher at Pusat Penelitian Politik, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, Jakarta
E-mail: u5480963@anu.edu.au/
dini.suryani@lipi.go.id

Defending Democracy: Citizen Participation in Election Monitoring in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia

ABSTRACT

The collapse of the authoritarian regime in 1998 has made Indonesia as one of the most democratic country in Southeast Asia. To ensure the quality of democracy, in particular electoral democracy, supervision and monitoring of elections has a very important role. Although the *Badan Pengawas Pemilu (Bawaslu)* or Election Supervisory Body of Indonesia has experienced institutional strengthening, this institution has not yet become effective in supervising and monitoring the elections. Therefore, election monitoring conducted by non-state agencies, particularly the citizens become important to complement the performance of Bawaslu. This article aims to explore how the election monitoring conducted by citizens in the aftermath of post authoritarian era, affect the quality of Indonesian democracy. This article argues that although the citizen participation in monitoring the elections is likely to decline, but the crowd sourced method that appeared in the 2014 election has succeeded in improving the quality of the electoral process as well as defending the democratic regime in Indonesia.

KEYWORDS: Election monitoring, Citizen participation, Quality of democracy, Post-Authoritarian, Indonesia

INTRODUCTION

Since the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1998, Indonesia has been considered as one of few democratic countries in Southeast Asia. Indonesia's

elections from 1999 until 2014 are considered as free and fair elections. Although in 2014 according to Freedom House (2014), Indonesia has experienced a declining in democratic status, Indonesia is still seen as a role model of democracy in Southeast Asia (Cochrane, 2014).

However, criticisms are still unavoidable in regards to the electoral democracy in Indonesia. Various frauds, manipulations and malpractices of electoral process take place in Indonesia's elections; for example, the spread of bureaucracy mobilisations, (Agustino, 2009; Rozi, 2006) and the practice of money politics (Aspinall, 2014; Indonesia Corruption Watch, 2014). Voter intimidation is also rampant in Indonesia's electoral process where voters are being threatened to not vote or give their voting rights to others and to choose or not choose a particular political party and candidate (Altmeyer, 2014; Clark & Palmer, 2008). This situation is exacerbated by poor management of the election from chaotic voters' registration to the manipulation of ballot boxes when they are transmitted to a higher level (Kompas, 2009; Mietzner, 2009). These frauds, manipulations and malpractices in elections clearly undermine the quality of Indonesian democracy. Therefore, supervision and monitoring on elections are essential in maintaining the credibility of an electoral democratic process.

The state's election supervisory institution that emerged since 1982 continues to have institutional strengthening,

especially in the post-authoritarian era (Bawaslu, 2014; Supriyanto (et.al), 2012). In 2007 the institution named Bawaslu was established. Based on Law No 22 of 2007 on General Elections, its main authorities are supervising the stages of elections, receiving complaints and handling the case of administrative fraud as well as criminal and code of conduct violations of the election. In 2011, based on Law No 15 of 2011 of General Elections, Bawaslu is also empowered by the authorities to handle electoral disputes. Institutionally Bawaslu continues to strengthen, but this institution is considerably ineffective in supervising and monitoring the elections (Ismail (et.al), 2014; Supriyanto (et.al), 2012; Tjiptabudy, 2014). Therefore, election monitoring by non-state agencies, especially citizens is significant to compensate for the ineffectiveness of Bawaslu's performance.

Citizen participation in Indonesia's elections is relatively high.¹ Voters' turnout rates in 2014 election reached 67.25 per cent for parliamentary election and 69.58 per cent for presidential election (International IDEA, 2014a). However, citizens' participation in democracy is not just a matter of voters' turnout rates in elections, but it is also about participating actively to safeguard and monitor the elections in order to result in a free and fair election. This article discusses the monitoring initiated by citizens in Indonesia's electoral democracy, to see to what extent citizen participation in electoral monitoring affects the quality of Indonesian democracy. With focusing to elections in national level, this paper argues that although citizen participation in monitoring the Indonesian elections is likely to decline, crowd sourced method of election monitoring in Indonesia's 2014 election, such as Mata Massa (Eyes of the Masses) in

parliament election and Kawal Pemilu (Guard the Election) in presidential election successfully improved the transparency and quality of electoral process as well as defended democracy in Indonesia.

This article will be divided into five parts. Part one will explain about the research method used in the study. Part two will discuss the theoretical overview of citizen participation in election monitoring and its impact on democracy. It also includes the comparison between traditional and crowd-sourced methods of election monitoring. Part three will examine the first emergence of citizen participation in election monitoring in Indonesia, which appeared at the end of authoritarian era. Part four will discuss citizen participation in election monitoring in Indonesia's post-authoritarian era by dividing it into two sub-sections. The first sub-section will discuss citizen monitoring in 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections and the second sub-section will focus on 2014 election where crowd sourced methods of election monitoring such as *Kawal Pemilu* appeared for the first time. Part five will conclude the discussion.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study uses qualitative-descriptive method. According to Sarantakos (1998, p. 6), qualitative-descriptive method employs a non-quantitative data collection and analysis, which aimed to explore the social relations, systems, or events by providing background information about the issue in question. In this case, this article figures out how citizen monitoring in the electoral process correlates with the quality of democracy in Indonesia. The data were obtained from primary and secondary resources. While the former were obtained from *Mata Massa* and *Kawal Pemilu* official application and

websites, the latter were sourced from books, journals and mass media articles that related to the topic discussed. The data were analysed by using thematic analysis, which emphasised on the position of the idea in the material under investigation (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2005, pp. 111-112).

THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK

What is the different between election monitoring and election observation? Bjornlund (2004, pp. 40-41) explains that “monitoring” and “observation” signifying two different positions in a range along with two different aspects. First, the “degree of involvement in the process” and second, the period of time over which the activity occurs.

First, concerning the involvement, “observation” connotes to something relatively passive, while “monitoring” refers to something more engaged. Bjornlund (2004, p. 41) also notes that in theory level, “observation” is limited to reporting and recording, whereas “monitoring” enables some possibilities of modest interventions to correct the deficiencies or to offer recommendation for action. However, in practice, observers at the polling stations often deliver some advice or highlight some problems that can be fixed.

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) defines “observation” as activities that “involve gathering information and making informed judgement from that information” (International IDEA, 1997, p. 8). On the other hand it defines “monitoring” as activities that “involves the authority to observe an election process and to intervene in that process if relevant laws or standard procedures are being violated or ignored” (International IDEA, 1997, p. 8). However, this definition is

problematic because as noted by Bjornlund (2004, p. 41), most of monitoring organisations do not have formal and legal authority to intervene the electoral process. It is totally appropriate for domestic monitoring organisations to have such authority, but it may or may not be acceptable for international actors. Therefore, according to Bjornlund, by definition neither of observers nor monitors have a formal role (Bjornlund, 2004, p. 41). Nevertheless, formal role of election observing and monitoring owned by the government institutions that assigned for that function. However, as mentioned earlier, this paper will focus on citizen-initiated election monitoring rather than election monitoring institution owned by the government.

Second, regarding period of time, “observation” implies a shorter involvement compare to monitoring (see Foeken & Dietz, 2000, p. 136). The activity of domestic or international organisations that pay attention mainly on the polling day itself is called “observation” and the individuals representing those organisations called as “observers.” On the other hand, if the organisations focus on the election process over time, the engagement might be better called as “monitoring,” but the individuals representing such monitoring groups still called “observers” (Bjornlund, 2004, p. 41). Based on this explanation, this article tends to elaborate on election monitoring rather than election observation.

The Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation, a key document for election monitoring defines “election monitoring” as a systematic, comprehensive information gathering, concerning the laws and regulation, process and institutions related to the conduct of elections. It includes monitoring in pre-election, electionday,

and post-election periods through long-term and comprehensive observation, employing a variety of methods (United Nation, 2005).

In Indonesian context, election monitoring activities are guaranteed by the law, the Bawaslu Regulation No 11 of 2014 on Election Monitoring. The regulation defines election monitoring as the activities that include observing, examining, inspecting and assessing the election process in accordance with the provisions of legislation (Article 1, Verse 25). Besides emphasising Bawaslu role in election monitoring, this regulation also ensures the citizens' involvement in election monitoring as specified in Article 49. The involvement includes monitoring, reporting alleged election violations are many corrupt governments, so their elections need to be monitored by other parties. Second, good governance and democracy become most important principles that should be met by the governments to get financial and external support from the donor community such as World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Elections in Kenya in 1992, Uganda in 1996, Indonesia in 1999 and Zimbabwe in 2002 are some examples that the donor communities forced the governments to be monitored (Kelley, 2012, pp. 28-29). Now the question is, how does election monitoring correlate with democracy?

Diamond and Morlino (2004) suggest that citizen political participation is a key dimension of democratic quality.² In a high quality democracy, citizens must be ensured that they could use their political participation rights to influence the decision-making process such as elections. This concept of participation brought by Diamond and Morlino (2004) essentially requires citizens to not

only vote, but to also be actively involved in the political process as a whole, including the elections monitoring. Election monitoring by citizen groups, foreign governments and international observers will contribute to democratic quality in three ways. First, it improves the transparency and quality of a political process. This in turn will result in greater public confidence in elections, which also increase the legitimation of election results (Gromping, 2011; NDI, 1996). Second, it encourages public involvement in public affairs. This will help to transform the way citizens view their relationship and participation in politics and governance (NDI, 1996). Third, it promotes political accountability; broader political and civil liberty rights and the rule of law in general, thus could be a step forward toward substantial democracy (Gromping, 2011).

Based on actors, there are three types of election monitoring organisations (EMOs) (Bjornlund, 2004, p. 38). First, international observation or international monitoring of transitional or other exceptional elections conducted by missions sent by the governments, multilateral organisations, or international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Second, domestic monitoring conducted by national organisations, such as non-partisan NGOs and civic groups. Third, international supervision managed by intergovernmental organisations of post-conflict elections, referenda and other self-determination exercises. The focus of this article- citizen participation - is clearly included in domestic monitoring.

Based on methods, Gromping (2012) suggests that there are two kinds of election monitoring that both involved citizen participation, they are (1) traditional and (2) crowd sourced election monitoring. Traditional election monitoring refers to

TABLE 1. COMPARISON BETWEEN TRADITIONAL AND CROWDSOURCED ELECTION MONITORING

	TRADITIONAL ELECTION MONITORING	CROWDSOURCED ELECTION MONITORING
	Expert knowledge	Wisdom of the crowd
	Trained and known observers	Untrained, anonymous observers
	Structured observation via forms and questionnaires	Observation usually structured by event categories.
	Structured and unstructured observations	
	Limited number of observers	Potentially unlimited numbers of observers
	Known expected number of reports	Number of reports varies widely and depend heavily on outreach
	Truth established by expertise	Probabilistic truth, relies on great and diverse number of observations
Civil society mobilisation	Civil society mobilisation necessary prior to mission (only domestic EMOs)	Civil society mobilisation necessary before, during and after mission
		Limited to citizens with access to internet and/or mobile technology
	Publication of findings → time-lag	Mapping → near real-time
	Capacity building: voters education, training for parties, training for EMBs	Usually no capacity-building
Outputs	Recommendations to election monitoring body, government and political parties	Usually no recommendations
	Requires invitation/accreditation	
Legitimacy and mandate	Legitimacy through invitation/accreditation	No legitimacy. Seldom endorsed
	Bound to mandate	Self-organized; can sometimes operate under restrictive circumstances
	Dependent on donor funding	Cost negligible-independent from donors.

Source: (Gromping, 2012)

observations activities where the citizens that become observers receive some kind of training, a wider range of activities than simple observation and reporting. In other words, the actor of traditional monitoring needs an expertise. On the contrary, crowdsourced method allows citizen with no such expertise involve in election monitoring through information, communication and technologies (ICTs) namely internet platform (including social media) and software application both through computers and mobile phone. The name of crowdsourced itself marks a shift from the generation of relevant information from expert election observers to the “crowd” (Gromping, 2011). A deeper comparison between the two methods delivered by Gromping (2012)(see Table 1).

From the comparison above, it is clear that the crowdsourced method has several advantages compare to traditional method, namely the speed of delivering the report is near real time and it does not dependent to donors in terms of funding due to cheap cost. However, the accuracy of crowdsourced method is questionable because one does not need accurate knowledge to do election monitoring (Gromping, 2012). Beside that, the output of the crowdsourced method is limited to report or mapping as the result of monitoring the election. It ignores the aspect of society capacity building, which also plays a major role in democratisation process, as accommodated by the traditional method. Therefore, both have the same equal significance in monitoring the election.

RESULT AND ANALYSIS

THE FIRST EMERGENCE OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN INDONESIA'S ELECTION MONITORING

During the 32 years (1966-1998) of Suharto's autocratic leadership, there was only one non-partisan organisation that was involved in election monitoring, which is *Komite Independen Pelaksanaan Pemilu* (KIPP) or the Independent Election Monitoring Committee. KIPP was founded in 1996, a year before the 1997 election, the last election in the authoritarian era. Civic activists, intellectuals, journalists, lawyers, and former government officials initiated the establishment of KIPP.³ KIPP was a response to manipulative elections that always won by the government's party, *Golongan Karya* (Golkar). It was intended to promote a fairer and more competitive election as a significant step toward genuine democracy and a real fresh hope for the public (Bjornlund, 2004, p. 258; HRW, 1996).

On the election day, 29 May 1997, KIPP mobilised 9,000 volunteers in its 40 branches to monitor the election independently and to report the process in 600 polling stations (Schiller, 1999, p. 11; van Klinken, 1997). The attempt to monitor the elections certainly was hindered by the authoritarian regimes not only by the central government in Jakarta, but KIPP had to face difficulties of its branches in Central Java, Lampung, Medan and East Kalimantan. Some Golkar activists even established a 'counter' election monitoring organisation called *Tim Obyektif Pemantau Pemilu* (TOPP) or Team for Objective Election Monitoring that complained KIPP was based on liberal democracy rather than Pancasila democracy (HRW, 1996). KIPP still carried on its objectives, although there were so many obstructions from the government.

In carrying out their duties, KIPP volunteers concentrated their monitoring to some areas that had strong local chapters or where there was a history of election-related conflict. They monitored the ballot counting process at the election day where possible. However, the volunteers of KIPP were not able to monitor the vote tabulation process both at the national and provincial level. KIPP also did not cover polling stations to check the results systematically (Bjornlund, 2004, p. 261; Schiller, 1999, p. 19). With the obstacles faced by KIPP, it was unable to affect the electoral process in 1997 election. The Golkar party still won the election and the authoritarian leader Suharto remained in power. However, the victory of Golkar in fact had been recognised from the beginning by KIPP. KIPP also did not want to legitimise the election, which was not fair in any way. The purpose of the emergence of KIPP was two things, first, to invite citizens to organise themselves to protect their rights and second, to generate a framework for organisations committed to democratic transformations (van Klinken, 1997). Bjornlund (2004, p. 261) also suggests that KIPP's modest success began to popularise the idea of domestic election monitoring and the acceptance of citizen participation in electoral process.

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION OF ELECTION MONITORING IN POST-AUTHORITARIAN INDONESIA

After the collapse of the authoritarian regime in 1998, B. J. Habibie as the president in the transitional period realized the promise of some substantive political reform, one of which was open election in 1999. In Indonesia's current elections, KIPP is no longer the only domestic election monitoring. It indicates a more open political

system, allowing citizens to participate in the political system more actively, including monitor the elections. This section elaborates the citizen participation in election monitoring in post authoritarian Indonesia, and divides the explanation into two sub-sections. The first sub-section discusses the citizen participation in election monitoring in 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections, and the second sub chapter focuses on the 2014 election. The election in 2014 becomes one specific explanation because it marks a new era of citizen participation in election monitoring with the emergence of crowdsourcing methods based on Information Communication Technologies (ICTs).

GENERAL ELECTIONS IN 1999, 2004 AND 2009

As an election in the transitional period, the 1999 election invited the attention of civil society. In regards to election monitoring, besides KIPP, there were several other domestic election monitoring organisations (EMOs). Some of these were University Network for Free Elections (UNFREL), the Rectors' Forum for Democracy (the Rectors' Forum) and *Jaringan Pendidikan Memilih untuk Rakyat* (JPPR) or the People's Network for Political Education (Bjornlund, 2004, p. 263). UNFREL and the Rectors' forum were clearly university-based EMO's. On the other hand, JPPR is the transformation of Islamic organisations' networks such as organisation wings of Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, the two largest Islamic organisations in Indonesia (JPPR, 2014).

To monitor the election, KIPP deployed 125,000 pollwatchers while the Rectors' Forum mobilised more than 200,000 students, alumni, members of NGOs, teachers and other citizens. The Rectors' Forum also conducted a parallel vote tabulation

(PVT) to verify the vote independently, based on statistically valid samples of actual polling site results from each province. This method was assessed highly successful because it allowed domestic and international observers to see the accuracy of election official tabulation. On the other hand, UNFREL monitored the election by mobilising around 105,000 university students and faculty members in 22 out of 27 provinces in Indonesia at that time. UNFREL was seen as the most professional and best organised among other EMOs in monitoring the 1999 election (Bjornlund, 2004, pp. 264-265)

The emergence of these EMOs was supported by the international organisations that also paid attention to 1999 election such as United National Development Program (UNDP), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and others. These international organisations provided abundance funding, encouragement and advice in regards to election monitoring (Bjornlund, 2004, pp. 263-264). However, Bjornlund (2004, pp. 269-274) explains that the huge penetration of international organisations resulted in conflicting advice given to the EMOs and the excessive funding jeopardised their sustainability. Despite those unintended consequences of foreign support, the 1999 election shows the involvement of massive numbers of citizens in political activity once freed from authoritarian regime.

However, Bjornlund's (2004, pp. 269-274) concern about funding dependencies struck EMOs in next elections. KIPP in 2004 election had funding difficulty, which resulted in volunteer recruitment reduction up to 50 per cent (Assegaf, 2004). This situation made KIPP change the approach of

TABLE 2. NUMBER OF VOLUNTEERS FOR KIPP (JAKARTA REGION) AND JPPR

Year of Election	Number of Volunteers of EMOs KIPP (Jakarta Region only)	JPPR
1999	13,260	220,000
2004	145	140,000
2009	250 (parliamentary election) (number for presidential election not available)	3,000 (parliamentary election) 10,500 (presidential election)

Source: (Junaidi, 2013, pp. 6-7)

monitoring the election to sampling method. KIPP's monitoring focused on the polling stations that had a high potential for fraud and conflict such as Aceh, Central Sulawesi, Maluku and Papua (Ulfah & Faisal, 2004). Not much different from KIPP, UNFREL also experienced financial difficulty. To get around this problem, UNFREL, which already transformed into the Center for Electoral Reform (CETRO), no longer monitored election in polling stations level in 2009 election, but instead monitored from the policy level (Sihite & Ginting, 2009).

The biggest effect of the reduction of monitoring organisations operational funds is the decreasing number of volunteers that were involved in election monitoring as shown in Table 1. Although the number of KIPP volunteers to monitor the election in Jakarta region increased, nationally the number of KIPP volunteers decreased drastically (Sihite & Ginting, 2009). A significant decrease in the number of volunteers was also experienced by JPPR (Table 2).

However, despite the difficulties in defending democracy through monitoring the elections, it is also important to note that organisations like JPPR also implement voters' education programs beyond the election day. This kind of program, to some extent, also contributes to enhancing

democracy (Junaidi, 2013, pp. 21-25). Nevertheless, the declining number of volunteers for election monitoring remains a major problem that should be resolved because election irregularities keep increasing.

THE 2014 ELECTION

There are at least two reasons why the 2014 election is significant to be discussed separately in terms of election monitoring. First, because the previous election in 2009 was the worst management in Indonesia's post-authoritarian period (Kompas, 2009), so the expectation for improvement was higher in the 2014 election. Second, because the 2014 election marked the emergence of citizen participation in election monitoring using the crowdsourced method based on information technology. Two of the most prominent is *Mata Massa* (matamassa.org) or "Eye of the Masses" and *Kawal Pemilu* (kawalpemilu.org) or Guard the Election.

Mata Massais an application that was launched by *Aliansi Jurnalis Independen* (AJI) or Independent Journalists Alliance and ICT Laboratory for Social Changes (iLab) in November 2013. This application receives reports of election violations through mobile phone (see Figure 1). Ordinary citizens are allowed to monitor the election by reporting

election fraud such as practices of money politics through this application (Rumah Pemilu, 2013). *Mata Massa* deployed 200 key persons to organise the reports submitted by the citizens through their devices (Naing, 2014).

During the earlier phase of the legislative election in February 2014, citizens reported 294 cases. The reports consisted of 173 cases reported through a smartphone application and website, followed by 64 cases through text messages and 57 cases through emails (The Jakarta Post, 2014). By the time this article was written, there were 421 cases that reported to *Mata Massa* (see Figure 2). Most of the reports related to administrative violations such as campaign attributes in inappropriate places and vote buying or money politics practices (Rakhmani, 2014; The Jakarta Post, 2014). In total, *Mata Massa* received around 1,509 reports

and it contributed 1,390 out of 8,000 reports received by Bawaslu (Naing, 2014; Rakhmani, 2014). Unfortunately, as noted by Rakhmani (2014), Bawaslu, as an election supervisory agency that was authorised to take action against election fraud did not respond to the reports well.

JPPR, which was basically use traditional method of election monitoring as explained earlier in this chapter, also utilised ICT to monitor the election in 2014 to overcome the challenges of intimidation that its volunteers experienced (JPPR, 2014; Rakhmani, 2014). JPPR volunteers using the 'mention' feature on Twitter, an online social networking service, to members of Bawaslu to raise their awareness of election fraud. This method will prevent the volunteers from direct intimidation (Rakhmani, 2014).




FIGURE 1. MATA MASSA'S DISPLAY AS MOBILE PHONE APPLICATION

Source: <<https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.matamassa.android.app>>




FIGURE 2. MATA MASSA'S DISPLAY ON ITS OFFICIAL WEBSITE

Source: <<http://www.matamassa.org>>

The 2014 presidential election shows a higher competition, which for the first time involved only two pairs of candidates. They were (1) Prabowo Subianto, a former military leader, in pair with Hatta Rajasa, current government minister and (2) Joko Widodo, a DKI Jakarta governor who is also furniture businessman, in pair with Jusuf Kalla, a businessman who is also former vice president of the country. According to Mietzner (2014), this third presidential election⁴ determined the future of Indonesia's democracy because the candidacy of Prabowo, who is also former son in law of Indonesian's long time autocratic leader, Suharto, threatened democracy. As a former military leader, Prabowo promised a tougher leadership and a return to indirect election that Suharto brought for 32 years, which will revive the authoritarian regime (Mietzner, 2014).

After failing in the presidential nomination in 2004 and 2009, it seemed that Prabowo would not accept defeat anymore. Mietzner (2014) shows how Prabowo, who is supported by not only by the party machine, but also the oligarchic leaders. He

handed out a lot of money to village heads, religious, ethnic, and social groups leaders; and promised to distribute welfare benefits and projects if he were elected. On the other hand, the second candidate, Joko Widodo (or popularly called Jokowi) was not supported by the oligarchs who could oil the campaign with money. Even worse his party machine was not properly working. He was backed by grassroots volunteerism. Vote buying did not completely disappear in Jokowi's campaign, as Aspinal (2014) suggests that money-politics is an important part of Indonesia's electoral competition. Nevertheless, Jokowi's political machine was not as good as Prabowo's. However, Jokowi was supported by grassroots volunteerism, which instead of being given money to vote for Jokowi, they initiated crowd funding for Jokowi's campaign (Mietzner, 2014).

The competition of both candidates was more pointed when quick count (QC) electoral institutions announced their results on the election day, 9 July 2014. Lim (2014) summarises the quick count results with each margin of error (MoE) (see Table 3).

As a scientific method of vote counting, Lim (2014) suggests that QC is very important to monitoring the electoral process and vote counting. QC can be used to evaluate the quality of an election and in projecting and verifying official count, which in this regard is conducted by *Komisi Pemilihan Umum* (KPU) or Election Commission. The purpose of QC is to: deter fraud; detect fraud; offer precise estimates of outcomes; confidence in the electoral process and official count; and, measure the quality of the electoral process as a whole.

However, the QC made each candidate claimed their victory based on the different results of quick

TABLE 3. QUICK COUNT (QC) RESULTS IN 2014 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Survey Institutions	Prabowo Hatta (%)	Jokowi Kalla (%)	MoE
Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI)	47.48	52.52	1.00
Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI)	46.63	53.37	1.00
Populi Center	49.05	50.95	1.00
CSIS-Cyrus	48.10	51.90	1.00
Litbang Kompas	47.66	52.34	1.00
Indikator Politik Indonesia	47.06	52.94	1.00
Saiful Mujani Research Center (SMRC)	47.09	52.91	0.62
Poltracking	46.63	53.37	1.00
Puskaptis	52.05	47.95	1.00
Indonesia Research Center (IRC)	51.11	48.89	2.00
Lembaga Survei Nasional (LSN)	50.19	49.81	n/a
Jaringan Suara Indonesia (JSI)	50.13	49.87	n/a

Source: (Lim, 2014)

counts which stating them as the winner. This caused the unrest in the society and the supporters of each candidate were getting more divided. According to Aspinall and Mietzner (2014), the difference of QC results was part of Prabowo's strategy to create instability amongst Indonesians so in the midst of uncertainty, he could buy the time and steal the election results. As this paper mentioned earlier, after experienced failures in previous elections, in 2014 presidential election Prabowo could not receive any defeat anymore. The two survey institutions that declared Prabowo's victory, namely LSN and JSI (see Table 3) did not show clearly how much their margin of error in doing QC. Beside that, Puskaptis, LSN, and JSI did not show up when the organisation that oversees the entire public surveys institution in Indonesia, *Perhimpunan Survei Opini Publik Indonesia* (Persepi), asked them to be re-verified as a result of different quick count results, while other eight survey institutions met the demand of re-verification (Tribunnews.com, 2014). This was a main indication that these organisations were paid by Prabowo to execute his strategy. In this regard,

although Lim (2014) suggests that QC could become an election monitoring method, it also shows a limitation, as mentioned by Omotola (2006) while it could be used as a political statement, rather than an objective reporting.

In this kind of situation, *Kawal Pemilu* (kawalpemilu.org) or Guard the Election, an internet website platform, emerged to monitor the counting process conducted by KPU based on the C1 form, a form that stipulate counting results from each polling station in Indonesia. Ainun Najib, an Indonesian citizen who works as an information technology consultant in Singapore, initiated this site. He admitted that this website creation was triggered by uncertain situation due to differences in estimating the presidential election results issued by survey organisations. His two other Indonesian friends who work in Google; Felix Halim and Adrian Kurniady, who live in the USA and Australia respectively, helped him. They created software to download the data included in C1 form, a database as the backbone of the site, pages for data entry and various other features (Hadi & Widiyanto, 2014). The cost of

No	Tempat	Prabowo-Hatta (C1)	Prabowo-Hatta (DC1)	Jokowi-JK (C1)	Jokowi-JK (DC1)	Suara sah	Tidak sah	TPS Error	TPS				
	TOTAL	61.627.150	46,99%	62.576.585	46,85%	69.535.322	53,01%	70.997.607	53,15%	131.162.864 (+392)	1.364.151	1,19%	99,76%
1	ACEH	1.026.671	55,21%	1.089.290	54,39%	833.002	44,79%	913.309	45,61%	1.859.667	55.962	1,92%	100,00%
2	SUMATERA UTARA	2.814.953	44,73%	2.831.514	44,76%	3.478.032	55,27%	3.494.835	55,24%	6.292.884	31.041	0,61%	100,00%
3	SUMATERA BARAT	1.791.495	76,97%	1.797.505	76,92%	535.979	23,03%	539.308	23,08%	2.327.474	17.669	0,54%	100,00%
4	RIAU	1.341.459	50,15%	1.349.338	50,12%	1.333.426	49,85%	1.342.817	49,88%	2.674.894	18.545	0,75%	100,00%
5	JAMBI	869.264	49,27%	871.316	49,25%	895.056	50,73%	897.787	50,75%	1.764.320	13.691	0,73%	100,00%
6	SUMATERA SELATAN	2.125.022	51,27%	2.132.163	51,26%	2.019.376	48,73%	2.027.049	48,74%	4.144.398	31.770	0,53%	100,00%
7	BENGKULU	433.063	45,27%	433.173	45,27%	523.611	54,73%	523.669	54,73%	956.678	7.811	0,12%	100,00%
8	LAMPUNG	2.026.396	46,93%	2.033.924	46,93%	2.291.229	53,07%	2.299.889	53,07%	4.317.637	29.967	0,73%	100,00%
9	KEPULAUAN BANGKA BELITUNG	200.315	32,73%	200.706	32,74%	411.752	67,27%	412.359	67,26%	612.143	6.110	0,22%	100,00%
10	KEPULAUAN RIAU	330.653	40,36%	332.908	40,37%	488.572	59,64%	491.819	59,63%	819.225	5.614	0,64%	100,00%
11	DKI JAKARTA	2.521.412	46,92%	2.528.064	46,92%	2.852.843	53,08%	2.859.894	53,08%	5.373.828	53.634	0,65%	100,00%
12	JAWA BARAT	14.072.239	59,77%	14.167.381	59,78%	9.471.510	40,23%	9.530.315	40,22%	23.543.812	298.185	1,02%	99,42%
13	JAWA TENGAH	6.465.828	33,36%	6.485.720	33,35%	12.917.725	66,64%	12.959.540	66,65%	19.383.591	222.408	0,32%	100,00%
14	DAERAH ISTIMEWA YOGYAKARTA	975.925	44,18%	977.342	44,19%	1.233.083	55,82%	1.234.249	55,81%	2.208.708	33.843	0,22%	100,00%
15	JAWA TIMUR	10.078.065	46,89%	10.277.080	46,83%	11.413.080	53,11%	11.669.313	53,17%	21.491.077	236.290	2,10%	100,00%
16	BANTEN	3.184.460	57,11%	3.192.871	57,10%	2.391.618	42,89%	2.398.631	42,90%	5.576.047	60.570	0,37%	100,00%

FIGURE 3. KAWAL PEMILU'S DISPLAY ON ITS OFFICIAL WEBSITE

Source: <<http://kawalpemilu.org>>

purchasing a website domain and the server was only US \$65.77 or around 650 thousand rupiah (Hadi, 2014).

Kawal Pemilu has a simple way of operating. All data was scanned from the C1 form which downloaded from KPU's website with special software. This software cut the data needed, which the results, in the form of snippets from the C1 forms and this data placed in the internal sites (backbone site) were only accessible for Ainun and his team. *Kawal Pemilu* founders had started the work a day after the election, 10 July 2014. To help them, 700 volunteers from within and outside the country were recruited to input the data from 478,828 polling stations (Hadi, 2014). Ainun guaranteed that *Kawal Pemilu* volunteers were trustworthy. The volunteer recruitment was carried out similar to multi-level marketing method and conducted carefully to maintain the integrity of the counting process. *Kawal Pemilu* had diverse volunteers, from 14-year-old middle school student until a 59-year-

old pensioner, none of which was certainly paid. Ainun said some of the volunteers were also supporters of Prabowo or Jokowi, but they were still recruited, as long as they did not manipulate the counting process. *Kawal Pemilu* also had supervisory mechanism, making it easy to suspend or blacklist anyone found to have falsified data (The Jakarta Post, 2014). It also allowed other citizens to report data input errors (Hadi & Widiyanto, 2014). As *Kawal Pemilu* used the same data with KPU, the official organisation of the government, it had high level of accuracy. Thus, concerns of a crowdsourced method that has questionable accuracy, does not apply to *Kawal Pemilu*. This was supported by the sophistication of software used and high supervisory mechanism, thus reducing the possibility of errors or manipulations caused by human.

It takes a very short time - about five seconds for each C1 form; so, the data could be input in three days from the entire polling stations. In addition,

the data recapitulation could be traced easily so the voters could verify any data that appears in the site (Hadi, 2014; see also Figure 3). This is in contrast with the announcement of the results from KPU, which besides it took two weeks to count; it also cannot be traced back to verify the data. With different methods of counting, the result obtained by *Kawal Pemilu* and KPU were completely the same. Both shows Prabowo-Hatta gained 46.85 per cent of votes while Jokowi-Kalla got 53.15 per cent of votes (KPU, 2014; *Kawal Pemilu*, 2014). Although comparison of the two indicates that *Kawal Pemilu* was much faster with no difference in results, KPU should be appreciated because it uploaded the C1 form to its website in the name of transparency. This allowed *Kawal Pemilu* to be able to carry out its purpose of safeguarding the election. Furthermore, because the results of *Kawal Pemilu* came out first and it successfully demonstrated an objective counting process with high integrity, it put more pressure on KPU to perform the counting carefully and precisely. This made the fraud as concerned by Aspinnall and Mieztner (2014), which could be done by Prabowo, candidate who wanted to return Indonesia to the authoritarian period, could be prevented. *Kawal Pemilu* has shown citizen participation in defending democracy through election monitoring.

CONCLUSION

This article has shown that the willingness of citizens to guard the democratic process through election monitoring has grown since before democratisation started. Citizen participation, especially in election monitoring continued to increase until the first election of the post-authoritarian period in 1999. However, in regards to

traditional election monitoring, citizen participation was declining as shown by KIPP and JPPR cases in 2004 and 2009. On the other hand, Bawaslu as a state election monitoring body have not yet become an effective instrument.

Nevertheless, crowdsourced monitoring methods that appeared in the 2014 elections have shown that citizen participation strengthens the quality of democracy in Indonesia. *Mata Massa*, an election monitoring application that focuses on electoral fraud, managed to invite the enthusiasm of citizens to participate in supervising the elections by simply using a mobile device that is currently owned by almost everybody in Indonesia. Ordinary Indonesian citizens can participate in monitoring the election. On the other hand, *Kawal Pemilu*, which appeared in the presidential election contributed even more significantly to guard the election. *Kawal Pemilu* offered alternative information to assist and monitor the vote recapitulation done by the KPU. It has a very high accuracy and addressed the concern for the lack of accuracy that was attached to the crowdsourced method of election monitoring. Above all, through *Kawal Pemilu*, citizen participation in monitoring the election has defended Indonesia's democracy against the threat of a retreat to an authoritarian regime.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Although relatively high, voters' turnout rate in Indonesia tends to decrease. In the post-authoritarian regime elections, it is noted that 1999 had the highest voters' turnout rate that was 93.30 per cent. In 2004, the number decreased to 84.09 per cent, while in 2009 the participation rate was 70.99 per cent (International

- IDEA, 2014a). This figure is not much different with voters' turnout in Philippines, another democratic country in Southeast Asia region (International IDEA, 2014b).
- 2 According to Diamond and Morlino (2004) there are eight dimensions of democratic quality namely rule of law, participation, competition, vertical and horizontal accountability, freedom, equality and responsiveness.
 - 3 Bjornlund (2004, p. 258-259) notes that the idea of founding KIPP was brought by Rustam Ibrahim, an intellectual that later became the director of *Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial* (LP3ES) or Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education, and Information, who participated a conference of domestic election monitoring in Manila in 1995. KIPP was modeled on National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) in the Phillipines (which also the organiser of the conference), Fair Monitoring Alliance in Bangladesh and PollWatch in Thailand (see also HRW, 1996). Goenawan Mohamad, an intellectual and journalist of *Tempo* weekly (which closed down by the government in 1994) agreed to chair KIPP after approached by the students. Mulyana Kusumah, human rights lawyer and veteran activist became the KIPP's general secretary. Beside these two persons, the establishment of KIPP also supported by pro-democracy figures such as Nurcholish Madjid, Adnan Buyung Nasution, Arief Budiman and others (HRW, 1996).
 - 4 Direct presidential election is implemented in Indonesia based on article 6 of the Constitution. The first direct presidential election was implemented in 2004 and the second time was in

2009. Both elections won by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

REFERENCES

- Agustino, L. (2009). *Pilkada dan Dinamika Politik Lokal*. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar.
- Altmeyer, V. (2014). Intimidation versus inclusion: New Strategies in Indonesian Election Campaigning. *Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies*, 7 (1), 121-132.
- Aspinall, E. (2014). *Money Politics: The distribution of money, goods and other benefits is an integral part of electioning in Indonesia*. Retrieved September 14, 2014, from Inside Indonesia 116: <http://www.insideindonesia.org/weekly-articles/money-politics-2>
- Aspinall, E., & Mietzner, M. (2014, July 12). *Taktik Permainan Prabowo*. (The Australian National University) Retrieved September 22, 2014, from New Mandala: <http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2014/07/12/taktik-permainan-prabowo/>
- Assegaf, F. (2004, Januari 04). *KIPP Tidak Punya Dana Pantau Pemilu*. Retrieved September 18, 2014, from Tempo.co: <http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2004/01/04/05537928/KIPP-Tidak-Punya-Dana-Pantau-Pemilu>
- Bawaslu. (2014). *Sejarah Pengawasan Pemilu*. Retrieved September 14, 2014, from <http://www.bawaslu.go.id/profil/sejarah-pengawasan-pemilu>
- Bjornlund, E. (2004). *Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy*. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Clark, S., & Palmer, B. (2008). Peaceful Pilkada, Dubious Democracy. *Indonesian Social Development Paper.11*, pp. iv-v. World Bank.

- Cochrane, J. (2014, September 4). In *Southeast Asia, Indonesia is an Unlikely Role Model for Democracy*. Retrieved September 6, 2014 from New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/world/asia/in-southeast-asia-indonesia-becomes-a-role-model-for-democracy.html?_r=0
- Diamond, L., & Morlino, L. (2004). *The Quality of Democracy. CDDRL Working Papers.20*. Stanford: Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law Stanford Institute on International Studies.
- Foeken, D., & Dietz, T. (2000). Of Ethnicity, Manipulation and Observation: the 1992 and 1997 Elections in Kenya. In J. Abbink, & G. Hesseling (Eds.), *Election Observation and Democratisation in Africa* (pp. 122-149). New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Freedom House. (2013). *Indonesia - Freedom in The World 2013*. Retrieved September 12, 2014, from <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/indonesia#.VBJpkcKSws8>
- Freedom House. (2014). *Indonesia - Freedom in the World 2014*. Retrieved September 12, 2014, from <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/indonesia-0#.VBJrIMKSws8>
- Gromping, M. (2012). Many eyes of any kind: Comparing traditional and crowdsourced election monitoring and their contribution to democracy. *International Conference on International Relations and Development.2*. Chiang Mai: ICIRD Knowledge Network.
- Gromping, M. (2011). New Information Communication Technologies and Election Monitoring in Southeast Asia: Crowdsourcing in the Thai Elections 2011. *Regional Integration in Asia and Europe in the 21st Century.5*. Tai Chung: Asian Political and International Studies Association.
- Hadi, M. S. (2014, Agustus 3). Ainun Nadjib, Penggagas kawalpemilu.org: Ini Dataku, Mana Datamu? *Majalah Tempo*, pp. 108-111
- Hadi, M. S., & Widiyanto, E. (2014, Agustus 3). Pengawal Suara di Dunia Maya. *Majalah Tempo*, pp. 40-41.
- HRW. (1996, May). *Indonesia: Election Monitoring and Human Rights*. Retrieved September 16, 2014, from Human Rights Watch: http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Indonesi1.htm#P114_24418
- Indonesia Corruption Watch. (2014). *Korupsi Pemilu Legislatif 2014: Pemantauan atas politik uang, politisasi birokrasi dan penggunaan sumber daya negara dalam Pemilu 2014*. Retrieved September 14, 2014, from Indonesia Corruption Watch: http://www.antikorupsi.org/sites/antikorupsi.org/files/doc/Politik%20Uang/Hasil_Sementara_Pemantauan_Politik_Uang_d.pdf
- International IDEA. (1997). *Code of Conduct: Ethical and Professional Observation of Elections*. Stockholm: International IDEA.
- International IDEA. (2014a). *Voter turnout data for Indonesia*. Retrieved September 12, 2014, from Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: <http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?CountryCode=ID>
- International IDEA. (2014b). *Voter turnout data for Phillippines*. Retrieved September 15, 2014, from Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: <http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?CountryCode=PH>
- Ismail, I. Y., Yakoop, R. M., Jusoff, K., Febriansyah, M., & Nurwati. (2014). Democracy and Incumbent Political Power Struggle for the Indonesian Regional Head Election. *Asian Social Science*, 10

- (10), 212-218.
- JPPR. (2014, February). *Potensi Penggunaan Teknologi Informasi dan Media Sosial dalam Peningkatan Partisipasi Masyarakat Melalui Pemantauan Pemilu*. Retrieved September 22, 2014, from Pantau Pemilu: <http://pantaupemilu.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Laporan-JPPR.pdf>
- JPPR. (2014). *Tentang Jaringan Pendidikan Pemilih untuk Rakyat*. Retrieved September 18, 2014, from JPPR: <http://jppr.or.id/about-jppr/>
- Junaidi, V. (2013). *Pelibatan dan Partisipasi Masyarakat dalam Pengawasan Pemilu*. Jakarta: Perludem and The Asia Foundation.
- Kawal Pemilu. (2014). *Kawal Pemilu*. Retrieved September 22, 2014, from Kawal Pemilu: <http://www.kawalpemilu.org/#0>
- Kelley, J. (2012). *Monitoring Democracy*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Kompas. (2009, April 11). *Manajemen Pemilu 2009 Terburuk*.
- KPU. (2014, Juli 22). *Keputusan KPU Tentang Rekapitulasi Hasil Penghitungan Perolehan Suara dan Hasil Pemilu Presiden dan Wakil Presiden tahun 2014*. Retrieved September 22, 2014, from Komisi Pemilihan Umum: http://www.kpu.go.id/koleksigambar/SK_KPU_535_2272014.pdf
- Liamputtong, P., & Ezzy, D. (2005). *Qualitative Research Methods: Second Edition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lim, M. (2014, July 2014). *Apa Benar Kita Harus Tunggu KPU Saja?: Menyoal Real Count, Official Count dan Quick Count*. Retrieved September 22, 2014, from Indoprogress: <http://indoprogress.com/2014/07/apa-benar-kita-harus-tunggu-kpu-saja-menyoal-real-count-official-count-dan-quick-count/>
- Mietzner, M. (2014). How Jokowi Won and Democracy Survived. *Journal of Democracy*, 111-125.
- Mietzner, M. (2009). *Indonesia's 2009 Elections: Populism, Dynasties and the Consolidation of the Party System*. Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy.
- Naing, S. Y. (2014, May 1). *Citizen Smartphones Monitor Elections*. Retrieved September 22, 2014, from The Media Project: <http://themediaproject.org/article/citizen-smartphones-monitor-elections-saw-yan-naing?page=full>
- NDI. (1996). *Making Every Vote Count: Domestic Election Monitoring in Asia*. Retrieved September 1, 2014, from Democracy International: <http://democracyinternational.com/sites/default/files/Making%20Every%20Vote%20Count%20Domestic%20Election%20Monitoring%20in%20Asia.pdf>
- ODIHR. (2005). *Election Observation: A Decade of Monitoring Elections The People and The Practice*. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Warsaw: Sungraf.
- Omotola, J. S. (2006). The Limits of Election Monitoring: Nigeria's 2003 General Election. *Representation*, 42 (2), 157-167.
- Rakhmani, I. (2014, July 21). *Technology for Transparency*. Retrieved September 17, 2014, from New Mandala The Australian National University: <http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2014/07/21/technology-for-transparency/>
- Rozi, S. (2006). *Netralitas Birokrasi dalam Pilkada Langsung di Indonesia 2005: Studi Kasus Malang, Gowa dan Kutai Kartanegara*. Jakarta: LIPI.
- Rumah Pemilu. (2013, November 25). *Mata Massa Awasi Pemilu 2014*. Retrieved September 22, 2014, from Rumah Pemilu: <http://>

- www.rumahpemilu.org/in/read/3951/Mata-Massa-Awasi-Pemilu-2014
- Sarantakos, S. (1998). *Social Research*. Hampshire: MacMillan Press.
- Schiller, J. (1999). *The 1997 Indonesian Elections: 'Festival of Democracy' or Costly 'Fiction'?* Center of Asia Pacific Initiatives. Canada: University of Victoria.
- Sihite, E., & Ginting, K. (2009, Juli 5). Cukupkan Dana Seadanya. *Koran Jakarta*, p. 5.
- Supriyanto, D., Junaidi, V., & Darmawan, D. (2012). *Penguatan Bawaslu: Optimalisasi Posisi, Organisasi dan Fungsi dalam Pemilu 2014*. Retrieved September 15, 2014, from Rumah Pemilu: http://www.rumahpemilu.com/public/doc/2012_11_23_06_17_53_-Penguatan%20Bawaslu.pdf
- The Jakarta Post. (2014, February 8). Mata Massa receives enthusiastic response. *The Jakarta Post*, p. 4.
- The Jakarta Post. (2014, July 23). Voluntary Watchdog Initiative Displays Democracy At Its Finest. *The Jakarta Post*, p. 4.
- Tjiptabudy, J. (2014). Professionalism of the Regional General Elections Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah or KPUD) and the Regional Elections Monitoring Agency (Badan Pengawas Pemilihan Umum Daerah or Bawaslu Daerah) in Realizing Quality District Head's Elections. *Journal of Public Administration and Governance*, 4 (2), 81-86.
- Tribunnews.com. (2014, Juli 15). *Pengamat: Persepi Jangan Kapok Panggil Puskaptis, LSN dan JSI*. Retrieved September 22, 2014, from Tribunnews.com: <http://www.tribunnews.com/pemilu-2014/2014/07/15/pengamat-persepi-jangan-kapok-panggil-puskaptis-lsn-dan-jsi>
- Ulfah, M., & Faisal. (2004, Januari 5). KIPP Akan Pantau Pemilu Secara Kualitatif. *Koran Tempo*, p. 3.
- United Nation. (2005). *Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers*. New York: United Nations Electoral Assistance Division.
- van Klinken, G. (1997). *Citizens Organise Themselves*. Retrieved September 16, 2014, from Inside Indonesia 51: <http://www.insideindonesia.org/feature-editions/citizens-organise-themselves>